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Abstract
The need for information sharing has been increasing as
a consequence of the globalization of production and
sales, and the advancement of enabling technologies. Yet,
beyond resolving the technical issues associated with
information sharing and joint decision making, a greater
challenge is for the supply chain partners to understand
the “lost value” due to uncoordinated decision-making,
and more importantly, to determine how the recovered
value will be shared among the participating stakeholders.
This paper presents some models for understanding the
incentives for supply chain collaboration, and describes
the enabling technologies for collaborative demand
planning and replenishment.

1. Introduction
Synchronizing the supply chain from raw materials to the
consumer offers the greatest opportunity to improve
profitability and provide greater value to the consumer. It
is quickly becoming the standard for competition.

1.1 The Bullwhip Effect
A well-balanced and well-practiced relay team is more
competitive when each runner knows how to be
positioned for the hand-off. The relationships are the
strongest between players who directly pass the baton,
but the entire team needs to make a coordinated effort to
win the race [4]. Unfortunately, stakeholders along the
supply chain have different and frequently conflicting
objectives. Accordingly, the stakeholders often operated
independently, resulting in a phenomenon called the
bullwhip effect on demand and supply [14], [15], [3], [6].
As a result of the bullwhip effect, orders to the supplier
tend to have larger variance than sales to the buyer (i.e.
demand distortion), and the distortion propagates
upstream in an amplified form.

1.2 Supply Chain Collaboration
Supply chain collaboration requires industry-wide
process and data standards for information exchange. It
requires a reliable and secure data exchange medium to
facilitate collaborative decision making. Electronic data
interchange (EDI) was an intial attempt towards
facilitating communication between trading partners.
With the advent of the Internet, business documents
could now be quickly and securely exchanged.
Organizations such as RosettaNet have developed
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standards and guidelines for automatic system-to-system
exchange of business information and transaction [7].

1.3 Incentives for Supply Chain Collaboration
Enabling collaborative supply chain goes beyond
resolving the technical issues associated with information
sharing and joint decision making. Perhaps a bigger
challenge is for the supply chain partners to understand
the “lost value” due to uncoordinated decision-making,
and more importantly, to determine how the recovered
value will be shared among the participating stakeholders.
For example, in collaborative forecasting, if there is no
incentive to bind the customers to their forecasts, the
customers may be motivated to over-forecast to raise the
likelihood that the supplier will have sufficient stock
should the customers require more. On the supplier side,
if information provided to the customers about the
supplier’s allocation is not binding, if the supplier’s
situation changes, it could change the allocation at the
last minute.
This paper presents some models for understanding the
relationships between demand distortion and safety-stock
level, and describes the enabling technologies for
collaborative demand planning and replenishment.

2. B2B Means “Belly-To-Belly”
The need for information sharing has been increasing as
a consequence of the globalization of production and
sales, and the advancement of enabling technologies.
Improving supply chain efficiencies means the
companies should direct their focus outside of the four
walls of their enterprises. E-business technology is
beginning to restructure the ways businesses conduct
business. Yet, no matter how much has changed in the
new economy, business is still a function of the same
reciprocal, collaborative process of decision-making that
defined commerce centuries ago and still applies to
today's multinational trade. Supply chain collaboration is
not, and will never be conducted within the confines of
the impersonal, anonymous environments of computer
workstations. As Palmer aptly puts it, B2B may as well
stand for “belly-to-belly” [11]!

2.1 Inter-Organizational Information Sharing
Collaborative demand planning begins with information
sharing. Information sharing can occur within an
organization (intra-organizational) as well as across
organizations (inter-organizational).

A widely cited benefit of information sharing is that it
can dampen the bullwhip phenomenon. The bullwhip
effect often results in excess cost, such as inventory cost,
transportation cost or excess raw materials cost due to
unplanned and unbalanced production. Using simulation
and analytical research, [8] shows that sharing “sellthrough” data and inventory information from
downstream stakeholder might reduce the bullwhip effect
on upstream stakeholders.
Inter-organizational information sharing is at the core of
today's most important business strategies, including
Web enablement, supply chain management (SCM),
customer relationship management (CRM), multichannel
and mobile computing, and self-service applications.
Inter-organizational information sharing employs
collaboration techniques to create a multi-echelon supply
chain involving the focal organization and additional
suppliers and customers. At present, the most popular
collaboration models include the Collaborative Planning,
Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR) model [5], and
RosettaNet-based software solutions like WebLogic [2].
CPFR is a set of guidelines supported and published by
the Voluntary Inter-industry Commerce Standards (VICS)
Association. Trading partners share their plans for future
events, and then use an exception-based process to deal
with changes or deviations from plans. By working on
issues before they occur, both partners have time to react.
A supplier can build inventory well in advance of
receiving a promotional order and carry less safety stock
at other times. A retailer can alter the product mix to
reduce the impact of supply problems.
RosettaNet is an independent, self-funded, non-profit
consortium founded in 1998. The consortium is dedicated
to the development and deployment of standard
electronic commerce interfaces to align the processes
between IT supply chain partners on a global basis.
As of April 1999, the RosettaNet Managing Board
consists of 34 CEOs, CIOs, and executives representing
global members of the IT supply chain, including initial
board member companies: American Express, CHS
Electronics, Cisco Systems, CompUSA, Compaq,
Computacenter, Deutsche Financial Services, EDS,
Federal Express, GE Information Services, GSA,
Hewlett-Packard Co., IBM, Ingram Micro Inc., Insight,
Intel, Microage, Microsoft, Netscape, NEC Technologies,
Oracle, pcOrder, SAP AG, Tech Data, Toshiba
Information
Systems
and
United
Parcel
Service( http://xml.coverpages.org/rosettaNet.html).

2.2 Intra-Organizational Information Sharing
Intra-organizational information sharing occurs at the
data level and at the business-process level. These two
levels of information sharing have been widely studied
by SCOR [12] and RosettaNet (www.rosettanet.org).
Solutions such as RosettaNet rely heavily on the
definition of EDI-like standards for the exchange of data,
process knowledge, messages, etc. [2].

Intra-organizational information sharing means creating
or modifying the interactions among semi-autonomous
but related application systems, encompassing purchased
packages, legacy applications and new Web services.
This is generally realized through ERP or middleware
serving as an information backbone to transact and
convert data among disparate systems.
Enterprise Application Integration (EAI) links together
diverse systems and applications across the enterprise,
allowing the organization to keep pace with and respond
to market changes [9]. An enterprise resource planning
(ERP) system, on the other hand, provides an integrated
transaction processing fabric for an organization, which
enhances organizational performance by reducing
information inconsistency and by improving transactionprocessing efficiency.

3. Incentives For Collaboration
In [13], Sharafali and Co showed that significant savings
in inventory-related costs could be achieved if the buyer
and the seller cooperate. In analyzing the buyers’ and the
sellers’ replenishment decisions, the authors pointed out
that only the supplier benefits from such cooperation. In
order to motivate the buyer to cooperate, the authors
considered some cooperative strategies. These include
the analysis of the impact of (1) price changes, (2)
discount policies, and (3) partial deliveries. The authors
showed that the partial deliveries strategy is preferable.
This is in tune with the benefits cited in the literature as a
result of JIT-like relationship between the two parties
concerned.
Due to the bullwhip effect, suppliers often have to deal
with a demand patterns that are perceived to be erratic
and cyclical. The variability of demand increases in
moving up the supply chain from consumer to retailers to
distribution center to central warehouse to factory. This
section provides some models for understanding the
advantages of cooperation between the supplier and the
buyer: collaborative demand planning.

3.1 Optimal Safety-Stock
Uncertainties in lead time and demand exert considerable
influence on the stability and credibility of inventory
control systems. There are various strategies for coping
with the many sources of uncertainties. Murthy and Ma
[10] provide an excellent review along with the possible
research directions for coping with uncertainties in
Material requirements planning systems.
Let Yt = replenishment quantity at period t, for t = 1, 2…
n, where n is the length of the planning horizon. The
current period is t =1. If the lead time = L, then Yt, for t =
1-L, 2-L, .., 0, represent the on-order quantities that are
expected to arrive in periods 1, 2, .., L-1, L respectively.
Let It+L-1 = beginning inventory at period t+L. If the
forecasted demand for period t+L is µt+L, the
replenishment quantity made L periods ago should at
least be equal to µt+L - It+L-1 (Otherwise, there would be a

shortage). Supposed the desired safety stock for period

3.2 Forecast Errors and Safety-Stock

t+L is st+L, then Yt =

Suppose Dn is exponentially distributed,

[µ t + L + (st + L − I t + L )]+ . Let st+L =

βt+Lµt+L, i.e., the safety stock is a fraction of the
forecasted
demand.
Then,

then Gn ( x ) = 1 − e

, x > 0.
−1
p
h
=
, or e − (1+ β 1 ) µ1 =
.
Then 1 − e
h+ p
h+ p
h
−1
Hence, β 1 = − µ 1 ln
h+ p

[

Yt = [(1 + β t + L ) µ t + L − I t + L −1 ] . In the literature, the
+

βt+L is often referred to as the overplanning factor.
The actual demand Dt is stochastic and non-stationary.
Let Gt = demand distribution is with mean µt and
standard deviation σt. Assume the demand sequence {Dt,
t = 1, 2...} to be mutually independent. We assume that
the forecast for each period t is unbiased and is equal to
µt. Since demand is non-stationary, the optimal
production ordering quantities vary over the planning
horizon. In practice, under such an environment,
decisions are usually made on a rolling horizon basis.
That is, each time a period has passed, it is dropped from
the planning horizon, and the forecast demand for a new
period is added at the end of the forecast window.

or β 1 µ1 =

−

( p − h)(b1 − a1 )
µ1
( p + h)(b1 + a1 )

]

n
Min
E[TC ] = ∑ hE[ I t++ L ] − pE[ I t−+ L ]
β L+1 , β L + 2 ,.., β L + n
t =1

Subject to:

I t + L = I t + L −1 + Yt − Dt + L

Yt = [(1 + β t + L ) µ t + L − I t + L −1 ]

+

(2)

β t + L ≥ 0, for t = 1,2,.., n .
The objective function (1) is convex (see [1]). Solving

∂
E[TC] = 0
∂β t + L

Gt + L ((1 + β t + L ) µ t + L ) =

leads

p
, t = 1,2,..., n.
p+h

to
(3)

Note that (3) is true for any lead-time L, for simplicity
we assume that L = 0. As we have a rolling schedule, we
plan for the replenishment quantity for the current period,
i.e., we consider t = 1. Equation (3) then
becomes: β 1 =

 p 
 − 1 .
G 1−1 
µ1
h+ p
1

(4)

We note that the successive overplanning factors are
constant if the sequence of demands are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.).

h+ p
− µ1 . The optimal safety stock
h

It can be shown that the optimal safety stock β1µ1 =

optimal replenishment problem is to determine Yt, for t =
1, 2… n, such that:

(1)

µ12 ln

]

Suppose Dn is uniformly distributed over (an , bn), then
 x − an
 b − a , a n < x < bn
n
 n
Gn ( x ) = 1
, x ≥ bn
.
0
, otherwise



and [I t ] = − min( 0, I t ) . The

[

− (1+ β 1 ) µ1−1

is a quadratic function of the sales forecast! Clearly, this
can be seen as the worst-case scenario. If the demand
distribution is exponentially distributed, the level of
uncertainly as measured by the variance is as large as the
forecast itself (the mean).

Suppose demand not met are backordered at a cost of p
$/unit; and the unit inventory holding cost is h $/unit. If
the ending inventory in period t is It. the total inventory
cost for period t is h[It ]+- p[It]-, where

[I t ]+ = max(0, I t )

− µ n−1 x

Apparently 0 < β1 <1. This guarantees that the safetystock level will never exceed 100% of forecasts.
Moreover, if the forecasts are unbiased, then (b1+a1)/2=
u1, the optimal safety stock is 2 ⋅

( p − h)
⋅ (b1 − a1 ) ,
( p + h)

i.e., the optimal safety-stock level is directly proportional
to the forecast error = κ ⋅ (b1 − a1 ) . It is noteworthy that
as inventory-holding cost approaches backordering cost,
the need for safety stock diminishes.
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